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Abstract—With the wide deployment of network facilities and
the increasing requirement of network reliability, the disruptive
event like natural disaster, power outage or malicious attack has
become a non-negligible threat to the current communication
network. Such disruptive event can simultaneously destroy all
devices in a specific geographical area and affect many network
based applications for a long time. Hence, it is essential to
build disaster-resilient network for future highly survivable
communication services. In this paper, we consider the problem
of designing a highly resilient network through the technique
of SDN (Software Defined Networking). In contrast to the
conventional idea of handling all the failures on the control
plane (the controller), we focus on an integrated design to
mitigate disaster risks by adding some redundant functions on the
data plane. Our design consists of a sub-graph based proactive
protection approach on the data plane and a splicing approach at
the controller for effective restoration on the control plane. Such
a systematic design is implemented in the OpenFlow framework
through the Mininet emulator and Nox controller. Numerical
results show that our approach can achieve high robustness with
low control overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
Networks having very high degree of interconnection are
vulnerable to the disruptive events such as floods, earthquakes,
power outages, electronic attacks, etc. Such regional damages
are usually unpredictable and may simultaneously destroy
multiple network facilities in a specific geographical area,
which result in a long period of network outages. For example,
the east Japan earthquake on March 2011 caused 385 tele-
phone offices stopping operation immediately, cut off millions
of users from the telephone service and even the emergency
restoration took more than one month [1].
The conventional techniques to maintain network continuity
can not work well in case of disasters. Network protection,
which relies on the expensive pre-allocated backup resources,
may fail to deal with regional damage when the backup
resources corrupt simultaneously with the primary ones. The
restoration mechanism, which computes new routes based
on the actual status of network, may introduce too long
convergence time to meet the requirements of mission-critical
and real-time applications, and leads to serious consequences
like transient loops and blackholes [2].
To build disaster-resilient networks, this paper focuses on
leveraging the technique of SDN (Software Defined Network-
ing) which provides more intelligent and flexible network
management. SDN networks, such as OpenFlow - enabled [3]
networks, decouple the network control plane from the data
plane, and have been successfully deployed in the operator’s
WAN and corporation’s LAN to provide robust network ser-
vices, e.g., the global carrier NTT communications networks,
Google and Microsoft inter-datacenter WANs, etc [4], [5]. Due
to its intrinsic great flexibility and global management of the
network, SDN is potentially suitable to execute an efficient
recovery during a major disruption.
Although SDN has a good potential for handling failures,
the current architecture may be not sufficient to recover from
large-scale failures such as disaster failures. Control plane
scalability and the recovery time requirement are the two major
challenges. Generally, the SDN controller computes routes
whenever a failure occurs. And the controller is responsible
for updating all the forwarding elements’ status. However,
the multiple failures caused by a catastrophic event will
simultaneously disrupt a lot of end nodes. This will lead to a
huge amount of reconnection requests, making it impractical
to offload the task of all the routing computation and to
update the forwarding elements’ status to the controller. This
is because the dynamic route re-computation can lead to huge
overhead, and inserting all new routes into SDN forwarding
elements alongside is time-consuming [6] and error-prone due
to the consistent packet processing problem [7], [8]. Moreover,
the stringent recovery time requirements of mission-critical
and real-time applications [9] make the enhancement design
of the control plane (e.g., the distributed control plane design
like Onix [10]) incompetent. This is because the status syn-
chronization among physically distributed controllers requires
additional time.
In this paper, we propose a new framework to deal with
the considered problems in face of disaster failures by SDN.
Several design challenges are addressed in this paper,
(1) Low controller overhead. The controller overhead should
be low in order to reduce the likelihood of controller
being the bottleneck.
(2) Fast recovery. The recovery should be quick in order to
meet the requirement of some mission-critical and real-
time applications.
(3) Strong connectivity. The connectivity ratio should be
2high even after a major disaster event destroying a lot
of network components.
To address above challenges, our main idea is to pre-install
redundant flow entries (backup entries) into the data plane.
Different from the previous enhancement design of the control
plane, our enhancement design of the data plane guarantees
that a large proportion of the reconnection requests can be
handled on the data plane. Since only a small fraction of the
requests are handled by the controller, the control overhead is
low. Besides, the data plane handled requests will not be sent
to the control plane, thus saving the round-trip recovery delay
between the data plane and the control plane. To address the
third challenge, we consider the disaster failure’s geographical
layout and its failure size distribution. In order to do this,
we adopt the novel metric of the vulnerable zone of a path
during generating the backup entries. So the pre-installed
backup routes are less likely to simultaneously get destroyed
by a disaster failure. By combing with the recovery on the
control plane, our design guarantees strong connectivity after
a disaster failure.
More concretely, our proposed design consists of two mod-
ules: the proactive local failure recovery module running on
the switches (data plane) and the reactive global restoration
module running on the controller (control plane). In the
protection module, we adopt the multi-topology routing to
do local fast rerouting, and consider the geography properties
(shape and size) of the disaster failure to generate robust
backup routes. In the restoration module, we give an ef-
fective algorithm to reconnect failed nodes by rescheduling
the pre-installed routes. We further consider the load balance
performance during recovery by formulating an ILP, after
which an heuristic algorithm is proposed. We implement the
prototype by utilizing multiple tables pipeline processing and
fast failover group tables of OpenFlow (Section III). Simu-
lations ( Section IV) on both random generated and realistic
topologies show that, the protection module is able to handle
approximately 70% of the reconnection requests. The rests are
processed by the restoration module. Only by rescheduling the
pre-installed redundancies, more than 90% of the disconnected
end nodes can be reconnected even when the failure diameter
is 1/6 of the network deployment region’s length.
II. PRELIMINARY
In this section, we first introduce the network model and
failure mode adopted in this paper. Then we introduce the
vulnerable zone of a routing path.
A. Network Model
We consider a physical network G(V,E) as a planar graph
inside the deployment area D ∈ R2, which is represented by
the network components: V is the set of forwarding elements
(routers or SDN switches) and E is the set of links connecting
them. In SDN context, all forwarding elements have a channel
connected to the central controller C (in-band or out-of-
band)1. By eij we denote the link between adjacent nodes
1The logical controller C can be implemented distributedly [11], [12], this
refers to the controller placement problem and is out of the scope of our
works.
Fig. 1. Vulnerable zone: the union of points that are located no more than
r distance from the network components. Any region failure occurs in the
vulnerable zone will break the network component.
i and j, i, j ∈ V, eij ∈ E. By xst we denote the path between
nodes s and t, s, t ∈ V .
B. Failure Model
During the extreme events such as disasters or malicious
attacks, multiple network components located closely to each
other may fail together. We summarize the behaviors of such
large scale attacks to model the “the geographically correlated
failure”.
Definition 1: (Geographically Correlated Failure) is de-
fined as follows:
1) Network components intersecting the region of failures
will be removed from the network. The size of a
geographically correlated failure is determined by the
radius r.
2) The radius r follows the distribution functions f(r),
ra ≤ r ≤ rb, where ra (resp. rb) is the minimum (resp.
maximum) considered region size2.
It’s notable that our model does not make any assumptions
about the failure locations and radiuses, which are usually
difficult to obtain due to the uncertainty of the disaster failures.
Our model is more general than the previous deterministic
failure model [14], [15] (which requires the knowledge of the
failure radiuses) and SRLG related model [16]–[21] (which
requires the knowledge of the failure locations).
C. Vulnerable Zone of a Path
According to the definition of regional failures, a disaster
region can be of any shape with arbitrary size and located
anywhere in the plane. Therefore, there are infinite number of
region failures to be considered. Our first problem is to find
a proper statistical metric to evaluate the impact of region
failures.
Given a regional failure with radius r, a link eij may fail if
it intersects with the failure region. In other words, if a disaster
happens and its epicenter is less than r distance from eij , eij
will be broken. We call the set of those points the vulnerable
zone of link eij , denoted by Zreij , defined as follows:
Definition 2: (Vulnerable zone of a link) is the region sub-
area such that any region failure with radius r whose epicenter
falls within it will always cause the corruption of the given
link.
2The distribution function f(r) of the destructive natural regional failures,
such as earthquakes, usually follows the power-law distribution [13].
3As illustrated in Fig. 1 (a), the “hippodrome” in dash line
represents the vulnerable zone of link eij , which consists of
all points whose shortest distance to link eij is no more than
r. Similarly, we can further define the vulnerable zone of a
path xst, denoted as Zrxst , as shown in Fig. 1 (b), which is
the union of all circle centers that are located no more than r
distance from the path.
Definition 3: (Vulnerable zone of a path) is the region
sub-area such that any region failure with radius r having
epicenter falling within it will always cause the corruption
of the given path.
The vulnerable zone of a path xst is the union of the vulnerable
zones of all the links of the path, i.e., Zrxst = ∪eij∈xstZ
r
eij
.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we first define the problem of SDN network
reliability against regional damage. Then we introduce our
system, which consists of two modules: the proactive Backup
Topologies Generation Module for local recovery and the
reactive Splicing Module for global restoration.
A. Overview of System Design
The problem to be solved can be defined as follows: Given
a network G(V,E) and a central controller C, 1) how do we
pre-install some redundancies into the network so that the
controller is able to reschedule these reduncancies and 2)
how does the controller reschedule the protection resources
with low controller overhead to survive from the large-scale
multiple failures caused by regional damage.
To solve the above problem, we apply the SDN framework
for failure recovery. Our design consists of two modules,
a proactive local failure recovery module working in the
forwarding plane (Backup Topologies Generation Module) and
a reactive global restoration module running in the control
plane (Splicing Module). The failure reconnection requests
first get handled by the local failure recovery module. The
reconnection requests that the local recovery module is not
able to handle are led to the global restoration module as
illustrated in Fig. 2.
How to install the redundancies for the proactive local
failure recovery module needs to be carefully addressed. To
reduce the controller overhead, we want to handle failures
locally as much as possible. However, the limited number
of redundancies on the data plane can not handle all of the
failures. We thus have to distinguish the types of failures,
so as to decide which of them to handle on the data plane
and which on the control plane. This “distinction” function
can only be implemented on the data plane. Otherwise it
would require the interference of the controller which may
lead to some additional controller overhead (to decide the
types) and additional recovery delay (the round trip time
between the control plane and the data plane). To make the
distinction on the data plane possible, we refer to the approach
of Multi-Topology (MT) Routing (RFC 4915 and RFC 5120
[22], [23]) to add redundancies. And by the joint design
of multi-topology redundancies and the multi-table pipeline
processing of OpenFlow, this distinction function is made
possible without any interference of the controller.
The basic idea of MT routing is to take the original graph
G as input, and generate k backup topologies {G1 . . . Gk}.
Routing tables {T1 . . . Tk} are computed and installed based
on {G1 . . .Gk}. Moreover, we notice that the recent research
on MT Routing, Multiple Routing Configurations (MRC) [24],
[25], is a good technique. The design goal of MRC is to
prepare different configurations for different single node or
link failures to achieve fast rerouting. With the adoption of
MRC, the goal of the distinction function is clear, i.e., to
distinguish the single link or node failure and the multiple
failure. Furthermore, during the route planning in each backup
topology, we consider the geographical distribution of network
components to reduce the likelihood of route corruptions by
regional failures.
For the reactive global recovery module running on the
control plane to handle the remaining failures, a straight-
forward idea is to compute new routes on the controller
for each failed flow and install all the new rules into the
corresponding switches ( [12], [26], [27]). However, such
an operation is time consuming and error-prone due to the
consistent packet processing problem [7], [8]. Instead, we
exploit the usage of pre-computed backup topologies to rebuild
the failed connections, and a splicing algorithm is proposed in
the Splicing Module at the controller to find new paths.
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Fig. 2. System overview
B. Review of MRC (Multiple Routing Configurations)
For the completeness of our work, we first give a brief re-
view of the MRC algorithm. The key idea of MRC routing al-
gorithm is to prepare multiple backup topologies {G1 . . . Gk},
and select a proper backup topology in accordance with the
current network failure state [25]. In each backup topology Gi,
some links euivi are defined as isolated links and restricted
links while some nodes ui are defined as isolated nodes. The
isolated links are set infinite weight and can be excluded from
Gi. The restricted links are set very high weight so that they
will not be chosen by some routing algorithms (i.e., shortest
path routing mechanisms) unless have to. A node ui in Gi is
isolated if and only if its adjacent links are all either restricted
or isolated. Whenever the isolated nodes fail, it will not affect
the connection of other paths.
4If node u detects a failure of adjacent link euv, u will select
a backup topology Gi in which the failed next hop link euv
is isolated. Then it will tag packets with the selected backup
topology id i to notify the subsequent node to forward packets
based on this backup topology. Since in Gi, euivi is assigned
a very high weight and it does not undertake any transit traffic,
the packets are guaranteed to reach their destination.
Generally, to restore an arbitrary single link or node failure,
the following constraints must be satisfied:
(1) Each node u in the original graph must be isolated in
at least one backup topology Gi. Each link euv in the
original graph must be isolated in at least one backup
topology Gi.
(2) Each link must be isolated with one of its adjacent
isolated nodes in one backup topology.
(3) All node pairs must be mutually reachable in Gi.
Fig. 3. (a):Original network G.(b)-(c):backup topologies G1-G3. Dark node
refers to the isolated node and dashed line refers to the restricted link. For
clarity, we did not draw the isolated links in Gi.
Fig. 3 shows the generated backup topologies. Every node
is isolated in exactly one backup topology. Consider a flow
with (src=1,dst=3): normally its path is 1→ 2→ 3 based on
shortest path in G. Assume node 2 failed and node 1 detected
the failure. Since node 2 is isolated in G1, node 1 would tag
the packet with tag 1 which refers to backup topology G1.
The alongside nodes will also forward the packet belonging
to the failed flow based on G1. Thus, the routing path from 1
to 3 becomes 1→ 4→ 7→ 8→ 3.
The MRC is originally designed for locally handling single
link or node failure. It is not adequate to handle multiple
failures caused by large-scale regional failure. To leverage
its redundancy, we first modify it based on the geographical
distribution of failures to better accommodate the Splicing
Module as described in the next subsection.
C. Backup Topologies Generation Module
This section first introduce how to generate routes on these
backup graphs {G1 . . .Gk} obtained by the MRC algorithm.
Even with a sophisticated path finding algorithm, it’s impossi-
ble for the limited number of redundancies on the data plane to
handle all of the failures. So this module is also responsible for
distinguishing the failure types so as to deliver some failures
to the control plane to get handled.
1) Geography based Backup Route Generation: After run-
ning the MRC backup topology generation algorithm, we
obtain multiple backup topologies {G1 . . . Gk}. If we run the
same path finding algorithm (i.e., Dijkstra algorithm) on all
these backup topologies, for specific nodes s and t, the path
between them, xist (on Gi) and yjst (on Gj) , will be possibly
coincided. This should be avoided because paths on these
backup graphs are too close to each other and are vulnerable
to a common risk. To improve the reliability of these paths, we
adopt the vulnerable area of a path during the route generation
in each Gi.
For each s, t ∈ G, we may have different paths on each Gi.
Compared to the original path in G, these paths are redundant.
They can be used to rebuild the failed connection between
s and t. However, if the vulnerable areas of backup paths
intersect, they can be possibly destroyed by a regional failure
simultaneously. Consider a flow with (src=6, dst=3): normally
its primary path in G is 6→ 7→ 5→ 3 based on the shortest
path. The backup path from 6 to 3 in G1 is 6→ 7→ 8→ 3.
The backup path in G2 is 6→ 4→ 5→ 3. The backup path
in G3 is 6 → 7 → 5 → 3. Assume that a regional failure
destroys node 5 and node 8 simultaneously. All the primary
and backup paths are destroyed. This is because in this case,
the primary path and the three backup paths are not region-
disjoint. If, however, in G3, we select the region-disjoint path
6→ 1→ 2→ 3 from 6→ 7→ 5→ 3 in G1, backup path in
G3 would not get destroyed by the regional failure.
To avoid the situation in which all the primary path and
backup paths are destroyed, it is required that these paths
are region-disjoint [28]. However, finding region-disjoint paths
is NP-hard even with a fixed failure radius r [28] and is
difficult to solve in general. Therefore, we refer to heuristic
algorithms. Our algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. It first
finds the shortest path x0st from s to t on G (G0) as the
primary path between s and t. Then it iterates on all the
backup topologies. [ra, rb] is evenly divided into k intervals.
Each backup topology Gi is resilient to failures with radius
up to ri = ra + (i− 1) · rb−rak−1 . This is achieved by reducing
the likelihood of the vulnerable zone of backup path, Zrieuv
intersecting with the vulnerable zone of the primary path, Zri
x0st
.
If the two vulnerable zones intersect, it means that they can
be both destroyed by a failure with radius ri. We assign very
high weight to those links whose vulnerable zones intersect
with Zri
x0st
to reduce the likelihood of choosing those links in
yist.
2) Implementation: If the packet can not be handled on the
data plane, they are sent to the controller to get handled on
the control plane. The data plane should be able to deliver the
failures to the control plane immediately after finding itself
unable to handle them. Unlike the traditional router, the data
plane and the control plane in SDN are usually physically
separated. Also, the controller should not interfere with this
logic. Otherwise, it would prolong the recovery time (due to
the round trip time between switches and the controller) and
increase the controller overhead. We achieve this by carefully
arranging the routes in the pipeline and leveraging the fast
failover group table provided in the OpenFlow.
5Algorithm 1: Backup Routes Generation
Input: network topology G = (V,E), backup topologies
{G1 . . . Gk}, source address s, destination address
t
Output: k backup routes in {G1 . . .Gk}
1 begin
2 Find x0st in the original topology G
3 for i←1 to k do
4 ri := ra + (i− 1) ·
rb−ra
k−1
5 forall the edge euv ∈ Ei do
6 if Zrieuv ∩ Z
ri
x0st
6= ∅ then
wieuv := very high weight
7 Find yist in backup topology Gi using the new
weight
8 return {y1st . . . ykst}
Generally, the OpenFlow pipeline processing consists of
multiple routing tables {T0 . . . Tmax} and a group table Tg.
Flow entries both in Ti (0 ≤ i ≤ max) and Tg consist of a
lot of terms. In Ti, entries consist of match fields, instructions
and priority. The failover group entries in Tg, consist of group
id and action buckets. Each action bucket is associated with a
specific port (watch port) that controls the bucket’s liveness.
The action buckets within an entry are evaluated sequentially.
The first bucket which is associated with a live port is selected.
The conventional routing procedure is to directly forward
a packet p to a specific port. In contrast, to leverage the fast
failover group, we first forward p to a specific group in the
group table. Then it’s up to the group to decide which port
to forward to based on the port’s liveness. The packets are
basically divided into two types, i.e., clean packets and dirty
packets. The clean packets are those packets that have not
encounter any failure yet via routing. The dirty packets have
encountered failures before. The clean packets and the dirty
packets are processed by different processing flows in the
multiple table pipeline. The two types of packets are explicitly
distinguished by the MPLS tag in the packet header.
The detailed procedure is shown in Fig. 5. Concretely, T0
is the starting table for all packets, which works as a diverting
table to divert packets to different processing flows.
(1) A clean packet p is diverted by T0 to one of the groups
in Tg. The group which T0 forwards p to, is responsible
for checking the liveness of the output port which is
based on routing table T0. If the output port is alive, p
will be sent out via that output port. Otherwise, it will
be tagged a MPLS label ø (ø is a backup topology’s
number) to indicate that it is a dirty packet. Then it will
be sent out via another port which is decided by the
routing in Tø.
(2) A dirty packet p with a MPLS label i is diverted by T0
to Ti. Then Ti will forward p to one of the groups in
Tg. The group will check the liveness of the output port
based on routing table Ti. If the port is alive, p will be
sent out, otherwise it will be sent to the controller to get
further processed.
Fig. 4. A regional failure destroys both p1 and p2. We rebuild the path by
installing one route on node e to divert traffic from p1 to p2.
D. Splicing Module
The splicing module refers to the reactive recovery at the
controller. It’s responsible for rebuilding the failed connections
that can’t not get handled by the pre-installed redundancies.
As described in Section III-A, unlike conventional approaches
that install all routes into forwarding elements, we rebuild the
failed connections by utilizing the pre-installed redundancies.
By doing so, the number of installed routes is reduced, thus
reducing the likelihood of the consistent packet processing
problem. A motivation example is shown in Fig. 4. The are
two paths from s to t, p1 and p2. A regional failure destroy
eae and eeb simultaneously. As a result, both p1 and p2 are
destroyed. To rebuild the connection, the traditional approach
is to install new routes along s → c → e → d → t, which
requires installing five new rules. In contrast, we only install
two rules, one on node s to divert traffic to p2, the other one
on node e to divert traffic from p2 to p1.
Another issue we consider is the load balancing during
recovery. Unlike the single link or node failure, the regional
failures usually destroy a huge amount of network components
simultaneously and lead to a huge amount of disconnected
end nodes. Such a huge number of disconnected end nodes
requires lots of reconnections. The splicing module should
handle the reconnections in a proper way to avoid that some
nodes bear exceedingly more rerouting paths than others. The
requests that sent to the controller give us the opportunity to
redistribute some of the reconnecting traffic. Aside from the
connectivity, we also consider the problem of how to reconnect
the failed paths. We first define a metric, then we give an ILP
to formulate the problem, after which we propose an efficient
heuristic algorithm to reduce the complexity.
We define the metric, maximal load to quantify the routing
load balance degree after a regional failure.
Definition 4: (Maximal Load): given a network graph
G
′
(V
′
, E
′
) after a regional failure (with failure radius r), and
a reconnection request matrix RM on G′ , the maximal load
gap is the load of the most loaded node in the network, where
the load of a node is the number of primary and rerouted paths
passing it, i.e.,
ML = |(Pu +R
′
u)|max, ∀u ∈ V
′
By Pu we denote the number of primary paths that pass u. By
R
′
u we denote the number of the rerouted paths that pass u
based on RM after a regional failure. Here, we consider the
primary resource and the rerouted resource separately, and we
assume that if a primary path for a particular node pair is not
6failed, the primary path can not be altered to avoid network
wide reconfiguration. Our goal is to minimize the maximal
load.
We formulate the problem by the following ILP,
minmax
i∈V
′
( ∑
∀s,t∈V
∑
eij∈E
xstij +
∑
∀s,t∈RM1
∑
eij∈E
′
ystij
+
∑
∀s,t∈RM2
∑
eij∈E
′
zstij
)
(ILP1)
s.t. zst is a routing path (1a)
ystij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀eij ∈ E, ∀s, t ∈ V
′ (1b)
The first part in the object function corresponds to Pi, in
which xstij equals to 1 if path xst passes eij and 0 otherwise.
xstij is computed based on the routing in G0. The second part
in the object function corresponds to the additional rerouting
paths that i have to undertake due to the reconnection requests
RM1. RM1 is the reconnection requests that can be handled
on the data plane. The second part can also be computed.
The third part in the object function computes the number of
rerouting paths that i have to undertake due to the reconnection
requestsRM2. RM2 is the reconnection requests that can not
be handled on the data plane. It is notable that RM equals to
the sum of RM1 and RM2.
ILP1 distribute the rerouting traffic in a min-max fashion.
However, the above optimization may not scale well to large
networks. In addition to the optimization, we also give a
heuristic algorithm. To evenly distribute the reconnections
request using the installed redundancies, for all node u ∈ E,
we record R′u on the control plane. We first construct a
temporary graph in which, we fill all the available segments
(not broken by the regional failure) from {G1 . . . Gk} into
the temporary graph. Then weight assignment is performed
based on R′u for all node u ∈ E. The detailed algorithm is in
Algorithm 2.
In Algorithm 2, we first test if s and t are physically
disconnected. If they are, it’s impossible to find a path between
them. Then we construct a multigraph Gtemp by adding edges
from k paths from s to t in {G1 . . . Gk} excluding the failed
edges. To evenly distribute the rerouting paths, we set link
weight of euv to the mean of R
′
u and R
′
v . After the weight is
set, we try to find a path on this temporary graph. If a path is
found, we update R′u, u ∈ V and return the splicing actions.
Otherwise, it means that the failed path can not be rebuild by
splicing the existing redundancies. In this case, one may have
to install a whole new path.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Simulation Setting
We use both random and realistic topologies for our sim-
ulation. The random50 topology contains 50 nodes and 120
edges, the random100 topology contains 100 nodes and 211
edges. The realistic Germany backbone consists of 50 nodes
and 88 edges. The deployment area is 1200 x 1200 (arbitrary
units) for all the cases. One connection is requested by each
node pair of the network. We implement our prototype using
Algorithm 2: Splicing Action Generation
Input: network topology G = (V,E), backup topologies
{G1 . . . Gk}, source address s, destination address
t
Output: a set of splicing actions.
1 begin
2 if s and t are physically disconnected then
3 return failed and abort
4 else
5 build a temporal topology Gtemp(Vtemp, Etemp)
6 Vtemp := V,Etemp := ∅
7 for i←1 to k do
8 forall the edge euv ∈ Ei do
9 if euv is alive and on the path from s to t
in Gi then
10 Etemp := Etemp ∪ euv
11 ℓeuv := i
12 else
13 continue
14 forall the edge euv ∈ Etemp do
15 weuv := (R
′
u +R
′
v)/2
16 find shortest path ptemp on Gtemp from s to t
17 if found then
18 forall the edge euv ∈ Etemp do
19 if euv ∈ ptemp then
20 R
′
u := R
′
u + 1
21 R
′
v := R
′
v + 1
22 else
23 return failed and abort
24 return splicing actions based on ptemp
OpenFlow 1.3.3 [29] and NOX controller [30] and examine
the prototype’s performance on Mininet testbed [31]. For the
throughput test, we use two PCs, one running mininet and the
other running NOX controller. Iperf [32] is adopted as our test
tool.
Comparsion Metrics. We use the following metrics to
quantify the results [33], [34].
• Recovery Ratio. Recovery ratio is introduced to evaluate
the capacity of network recovery to reset the connection
between pairs of disconnected nodes, which can be de-
fined as follows,
Definition 5: (Recovery Ratio)
Recovery Ratio = number of recovered paths
number of recoverable paths
As a result of multiple failures, the underlying topology
may be divided into disconnected components, or the
source (and/or destination) of a certain flow becomes
failed. Hence, we call a disconnected routing path as
“recoverable” if both the end nodes are alive and they
are not physically separated.
• Path stretch. The detail definition can be found in [35].
7Fig. 5. Prototype architecture
Generally, a path with longer stretch requires more net-
work resources. We adopt the notation of stretch to mea-
sure the ratio of alternate path length over the expected
shortest path length.
• Controller overhead. As the aforementioned idea of
backup topology generation, we try to reduce the load of
the controller by locally restoring the failed connection.
The effectiveness of this approach is measured through
the metric below.
Definition 6: (Controller Overhead) Controller over-
head is defined as the proportion of reconnection requests
that need to be processed by the controller.
• Maximal Load. As defined in Section III-D, it quantifies
the maximal load among nodes after a regional failure.
We compare our SDN-based Fast and Resilient Routing
against Disaster (SDN-FRRD) approach with the following
approaches proposed in the literature,
• MRC [25]. The MRC is designed for local fast recovery.
We evaluate it to see if it’s sufficient for regional failures.
• SDN-MRC. We apply the MRC to our novel framework,
by directly using the MRC in the Backup Topologies
Generation module.
• Path Splicing [33]. The advanced multipath routing algo-
rithm, path splicing, is to random splicing routes in the
data plane. The setting of Path Splicing is: using the same
number of k backup topologies as MRC and SDN-MRC,
the link weight perturbation function is: weight(i, j) =
(degree(i) + degree(j))/degreemax where degreemax
is the maximal node degree and weight(i, j) ranges from
0 to 2.
B. Evaluation Results
1) Recovery Ratio: Fig. 6 shows the recovery ratio in term
of the number of backup topologies k in the three topologies
when the radius of the regional damage is 50. From the graph,
we can see that both SDN-FRRD and SDN-MRC, that apply
the SDN framework can steadily achieve more than 90%
recovery ratio. Comparing to the MRC and the Path Splicing
curves, clearly shows the effectiveness of our SDN framework.
Fig. 7 shows the recovery ratio when the radius of the
regional failure is 100. The trend of the curves is similar to
the ones inFig. 6. When the failure radius is 100, the failure
breaks more links than when the failure radius is 50. Thus
the recovery ratio of the MRC, SDN-MRC, Path Splicing
gets decreased. For example, the recovery ratio decrease by
about 5% in Fig. 7(a) compared to Fig. 6(a), and decreases
by about 10% in Fig. 7(c) compared to Fig. 6(c). However,
we observe no significant decrease of the curve SDN-FRRD.
This is because in the Backup Topologies Generation module
(see Algorithm 1), we adopt the vulnerable area of a path
and consider the distribution of the failure radius to generate
backup routes, such that the recovery ratio is not significantly
influence by the size of the regional failure. This can also be
validated in Fig. 9, where the recovery ratio remains above
95% even when the failure radius is 150 in all the three
topologies.
Since the recovery ratio of the SDN-FRRD is almost
about 100% and is steady when the number of the backup
topologies k is from 6 to 15. Since small k already has
satisfying performance of the recovery ratio, small values of k
is sufficient. Because larger k means the backup tables would
consume more switch resources, network operators who have
a strict limitation of switch resources can consider choosing
the smallest k.
2) Stretch: Fig. 8 shows the stretch in term of k = 6, 7, 8, 9
in the three topologies. As we can see, in all the three
topologies, about 90% of the stretch is below 1.5. Normally,
larger k means more redundancies, which can lead to smaller
stretches. The four values of k achieve approximately equal
recovery ratio, larger k tends to have smaller stretch. This can
be seen, for example, in Fig. 8(c), the curve of k = 9 is on
the left side of the curve of k = 6, which means a smaller
stretch. This leads to a trade off between cost and performance
at the initialization of network, i.e., operators who want to
get a lower stretch can choose larger k, at the cost of more
switch/router routing tables consumptions.
3) Controller Overhead: Fig. 10 shows that when k = 6,
the controller overhead in terms of the failure radius. In all
the radiuses, the controller only needs to handle about 40% of
failures, which means the data plane has already handle more
than 60% of the failures. As the failure radius grows bigger,
the controller overhead has the trend to get heavier too. This
is because when more links are destroyed, it is more difficult
for the data plane to recover from the failure. Even when the
failure radius is 150, about 60% are handled locally.
4) Maximal Load: Fig. 11 shows the maximal load of the
splicing actions generation algorithm (Algorithm 2), compared
to the shortest path splicing actions generation. The shortest
path splicing actions generation choose the path with the
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Fig. 8. Path Stretch vs. Number of backup topologies k when the failure radius=50
minimal path length between a reconnection request (s, t)
when multiple rerouting paths between them are available
[36]. It however does not consider the load distribution among
nodes. The results of the ML reduction are normalized based
on the result of ILP1. From the graph, we can see that our
algorithm can reduce the ML. As the failure radius becomes
bigger, the ML also gets bigger, which indicates that without
consider the load distribution, the load imbalance among node
gets more severer.
5) Recovery Time: Fig. 12 shows the receive rate on the
Iperf client. A region failure occurred between the Iperf server
and client at 0.3s. Packets can not be handled locally by
backup tables, thus are sent to the controller. The receive rate
on the client did have a sharp reduction at 0.3s, but it recovered
very fast after about 10ms. The recovery time in real scenarios
differs, which depends largely on the round trip time between
a switch and a controller.
V. RELATED WORK
There are limited number of recent papers focusing on
leveraging SDN for large-scale regional failures. Nguyen et
al. [12] studied latency between a switch and a controller
and confirmed the applicability of SDN on disaster-resilient
WANs. Works in [26], [27] studied using SDN to meet carrier-
grade requirements and pointed out that the reactive approach
may not be able to achieve sub-50ms recovery. However, the
above works did not consider the heavy controller overhead
and the consistent packet processing problem [7], [8]. To
reduce the recovery time, Sgambelluri et al. [37] proposed
the proactive segment protection. Kamamura et al. [38] gave
a prototype to achieve IP fast rerouting using backup tables
via autonomous OpenFlow controllers. The proposed proactive
recovery can significantly reduce the recovery time. But, in
face of region failure scenarios, the performance may be
significantly decreased since the flexibility of SDN’s global
view is not used.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a SDN based architecture to
enhance the reliability of network against disaster failures. We
propose our algorithms for geographic-based backup topolo-
gies generation and splicing considering the laod distribution
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among nodes, and implement our approach by utilizing mul-
tiple tables pipeline processing and fast failover group tables
of OpenFlow. Experiments show that, by well pre-designed
backup topologies protection, our fast restoration approach can
efficiently use the redundancy to achieve high reachability and
low stretch with low controller overhead. The load distribution
after a regional is more even, compared to the previous splicing
algorithm in [36].
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